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SURFACE WATER AND NUISANCE
LAW: A PROPOSED SYNTHESIS
HON. DONALD L. BURNETT, JR.*
This inquiry focuses upon an intersection of the immutable laws of
nature with the changing laws of man. Nature always has decreed that
surface water flow from higher ground to the land below. But the
courts have adopted varying rules to allocate the burdens resulting
from the flow. This article examines those rules and proposes that they
be unified in Idaho.
Part I surveys the diverse rules of law applicable to surface water
cases. It notes that surface water flooding may be analyzed under gen-
eral rules of nuisance law or under certain narrower rules specifically
relating to surface water. Part II urges that these sets of rules be inte-
grated. It identifies the principles underlying the rules and undertakes
to synthesize the rules by accommodating those principles.
I. THE DIVERSITY OF RULES
Surface water is both an ally and an enemy of land use. When
water flows regularly in defined channels, it may be diverted and ap-
plied beneficially. But when the flow is irregular, or is not confined to
definite channels, it may impose a burden upon the use of property.
Surface water litigation usually arises when one landowner alters a nat-
ural drainage pattern and causes flooding of another's property. De-
pending upon the circumstances, the surface water invasion may be
characterized as a nuisance or as a trespass.
[Njuisance and trespass have common roots in property law,
and occasionally it is difficult to distinguish between them. But
where an invasion of property is merely incidental to the use of
adjoining property, and does not physically interfere with pos-
session of the property invaded, it generally has been classified
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as a nuisance rather than as a trespass.'
Thus, where a flow of surface water is altered specifically for the pur-
pose of redirecting it from one's own property to that of a neighbor,
effectively depriving the neighbor of the land flooded, the invasion has
been termed a trespass." In contrast, where flooding is simply inciden-
tal to another purpose for altering the flow, and the flooding dimin-
ishes the neighbor's use and enjoyment of his property rather than
wholly depriving him of it, the invasion has been termed a nuisance.
3
A. Nuisance and Surface Water Rules
Our focus here is upon the type of invasion that may be classified
as a nuisance-an invasion of another's property which is incidental to
an activity conducted on one's own property. As noted in the Second
Restatement of Torts, where a landowner knows that such an invasion
of a neighbor's property is resulting-or is substantially certain to re-
sult--from the landowner's activity, the invasion is treated as "inten-
tional" and it may represent a nuisance.
4
However, the law recognizes that nearly every land use has some
impact upon its neighbors. Not all "intentional" invasions are treated
as nuisances. Rather, an "intentional" invasion is deemed a nuisance
only if the invasion is "unreasonable." '5 The traditional test of unrea-
sonableness, articulated by the original Restatement of Torts, has been
whether the gravity of the harm caused by the invasion exceeds the
utility of the activity producing the invasion. Recently, an alternate
test has been added by the Second Restatement for determining liabil-
ity in damages. That test is whether the harm caused by the activity is
serious and the financial burden of compensating for this harm, and for
similar harm to others, would not make continuation of the activity
unfeasible.
7
1. Carpenter v. Double R. Cattle Co., - Idaho -, 669 P.2d 643, 646 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1983), petition for review granted (Nov. 10, 1983).
2. E.g., Milbert v. Carl Carbon, Inc., 89 Idaho 471, 406 P.2d 113 (1965); Johnson v.
Twin Falls Canal Co., 66 Idaho 660, 167 P.2d 834 (1946).
3. See Smith v. King Creek Orazing Ass'n, - Idaho -, 671 P.2d 1107 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1983).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SECOND RE-
STATEMENT]. The SECOND RESTATEMENT also recognizes that a nuisance may arise from
an unintended and negligently caused invasion. See SECOND RESTATEMENT § 822(b).
However, the question of liability arising from an accidental change in surface water flow
is outside the scope of this article.
5. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 87 (4th ed. 1971).
6. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 826 (1939).
7. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 826; see generally Carpenter, - Idaho -, 669 P.2d
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Surface water invasions incidental to intended uses of property
clearly invite application of these nuisance tests. Indeed, the Second
Restatement provides for surface water invasions to be examined
under nuisance rules.8 A leading case adopting the Second Restate-
ment's treatment of "intentional" invasions deals with an invasion by
surface water.'
But the courts generally have been slow to apply nuisance law in
surface water cases. These cases have evolved rules of their own. As
noted in one distinguished essay:
In so far as fundamental principles are concerned, there would
seem to be little or no difference between [surface water] cases
and the cases in which harm is caused. . . through the media
of fumes, noises, or vibrations. In each instance, one possessor
of land sustains harm in the use and enjoyment of his land as a
result, usually, of another's use and enjoyment of other land.
The problem is one of reconciling conflicting uses of land, and
the important question is whether circumstances exist which
will justify a court in shifting the loss, or a part of it, from the
person harmed to the person causing it.
Few courts, however, seem to have recognized this fact
•... The general practice has been to make different catego-
ries according to the medium through which the harm is
caused . . . and to adopt somewhat different principles of law
in each category. Consequently, in most jurisdictions there is a
separate and distinct 'law of surface waters' which in many re-
spects differs markedly from the law applicable in the same ju-
risdictions as to water courses, subterranean waters, and pri-
vate nuisances in general. Even with this segregation and
isolation of the law governing interferences with the flow of
surface waters, however, there is little uniformity in the princi-
ples of law adopted by the several jurisdictions in the United
States with respect to such invasions. Three principal and
widely divergent views have been developed-the so-called
civil law rule, common enemy rule, and reasonable use rule
10
These three rules of "surface water law" identified by Kin-
yon and McClure comprise a broad spectrum. At one end of
643.
8. See SECOND RESTATEMENT § 833.
9. Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977).




the spectrum is the "common enemy" rule which, in its pure
form, treats surface water as a hazard common to all landown-
ers. This rule accords to each owner an unqualified right to un-
dertake, upon his own property, to fend off surface waters as
he sees fit, without liability for the consequences to other land-
owners. The other landowners have a correlative right to pro-
tect themselves as best they can."
The "common enemy" rule finds its doctrinal antithesis at
the other end of the spectrum-the "civil law" rule. This rule,
broadly stated, is that one property owner may not interfere
with the natural flow of surface waters so as to cause an inva-
sion of a neighboring owner's interest in the use and enjoyment
of his land.'2 The rule recognizes a servitude for natural drain-
age of surface water. An owner of lower property must accept
the burden of surface water which naturally drains upon his
land. Conversely, the owner of high property cannot increase
this burden by changing the natural system of drainage.'8
The "reasonable use" rule occupies the center of the spec-
trum. It rejects the doctrinal elements of both the "common
enemy" and "civil law" rules. Under the "reasonable use" rule,
a landowner has neither an unqualified privilege to deal with
surface water as he pleases, nor an unqualified duty to refrain
from interfering with the natural flow to his neighbor's detri-
ment. Rather, each landowner is entitled to make reasonable
use of his land, even though it results in altering the flow of
surface waters and causes some harm to his neighbor. Liability
attaches only when the harm is unreasonable. The question of
reasonableness is one of fact, to be determined in each case
upon consideration of all the circumstances."' Thus, the "rea-
sonable use" rule is not so much a rule, in the normative sense,
as it is a pragmatic framework for balancing the competing in-
terests of landowners in particular cases. It treats as relative
those rights which are absolute under the "common enemy" or
"civil law" rules. It weighs competing interests in a manner
similar to the balancing process embodied in the nuisance law
provisions of the First and Second Restatements.
11. See generally Kinyon & McClure, supra note 10, at 898; Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d
1193, 1199 (1979).
12. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 10, at 893.
13. Annot., supra note 11, at 1207.
14. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 10, at 904-05.
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B. The Idaho Experience
The Idaho Supreme Court has endorsed the "civil law" rule, im-
plicitly rejecting the "common enemy" rule. However, the court has
maintained an uneasy ambivalence toward the "reasonable use" rule,
adverting occasionally to the general concept of reasonableness without
specifically addressing the rule itself.
An early portent of the "civil law" rule appeared in Teeter v.
Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District.16 There, a canal company col-
lected surface water from land above its canal and discharged it upon
other land on the lower side of the canal. The lower landowner ob-
jected, claiming that the concentrated discharge caused his property
greater injury than had the more dispersed natural flow. The Supreme
Court, announcing a "just and equitable" resolution of the dispute,
held that the canal company could not discharge the concentrated
water except in a manner that would "not increase the dangers and
damages over that caused by the flow of the waters in their natural
course."16
Another harbinger of the "civil law" rule appeared in cases involv-
ing disputes between riparian landowners over alterations to natural
watercourses. In such cases, the Supreme Court held that owners of
riparian lands adjoining natural watercourses could not obstruct or di-
vert the natural flow so as to damage other riparian properties.
17
In Loosli v. Heseman,6 the Supreme Court expressly approved the
"civil law" rule. The court held that an upper landowner had an ease-
ment of drainage across the land of a lower proprietor, to the extent of
water naturally flowing from the higher ground to the lower tract.
However, this servitude could not be augmented by acts of the upper
landowner. Notably, the surface water at issue in Loosli had flowed
from the upper ground to the lower tract not through an established
watercourse, but through an irregular swale. Thus, by adopting the
"civil law" rule and applying it to surface water outside a watercourse,
the Supreme Court broadened the rule of noninterference earlier ap-
plied to owners of riparian lands along watercourses.
However, after Loosli was decided, the riparian rule of noninter-
ference underwent change. A reformulation of the rule, adverting to a
concept of reasonableness, began to emerge. In Poole v. Olaveson,19 our
15. 19 Idaho 355, 114 P. 8 (1911).
16. Id. at 359, 114 P. at 9.
17. E.g., Scott v. Watkins, 63 Idaho 506, 122 P.2d 220 (1942); Fischer v. Davis, 19
Idaho 493, 116 P. 412 (1911).
18. 66 Idaho 469, 162 P.2d 393 (1945).
19. 82 Idaho 496, 356 P.2d 61 (1960).
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Supreme Court held that one landowner could discharge waste water
into an artificially modified watercourse, crossing the lands of another,
to an extent that was reasonable and noninjurious. The court employed
similar language in Smith v. Big Lost River Irrigation District.20 There
the court said that a riparian owner who interfered with the natural
flow in a watercourse, by diverting it to an artificial channel, was "lia-
ble for the exercise of reasonable care and diligence in so doing and
[was] required to take such precautions as to prevent injury to
others."21
However, the drift toward a standard of reasonableness was not
evidenced in all surface water cases. In Harper v. Johannesen,2 the
Idaho Supreme Court reiterated the "civil law" rule and applied it
without qualification to a riparian landowner dispute. In Dayley v.
City of Burley,23 the court again endorsed the "civil law" rule, con-
trasting it with the "common enemy" rule but saying nothing about
the "reasonable use" rule. However, a majority of the court implicitly
acknowledged-and a dissenting minority expressly cited-authority
that even in cases governed by the "civil law" rule, an upper proprietor
is entitled to alter the natural flow of surface water, by collecting and
concentrating it, so long as it is carried across the lower proprietor's
ground within the confines of a natural watercourse. ' The majority of
the Dayley court sustained a trial judge's finding that no natural wa-
tercourse existed in that case. Accordingly, the majority held that an
upper proprietor, the City of Burley, was not entitled to collect surface
water through its storm drainage system and to discharge it across pri-
vately owned lands below.26 The dissenting opinion argued for a con-
trary result upon the premise that a natural watercourse did, in fact,
exist.
2 6
Dayley neither nourished nor expressly extinguished the nascent
stirrings of reasonableness in earlier cases. It accorded continued vital-
ity to the "civil law" rule; but it also suggested that application of the
rule could turn upon the existence of a natural watercourse. This sug-
gestion later was elevated into a holding by the Idaho Court of Appeals
20. 83 Idaho 374, 364 P.2d 146 (1961).
21. Id. at 381, 364 P.2d at 150.
22. 84 Idaho 278, 371 P.2d 842 (1962).
23. 96 Idaho 101, 524 P.2d 1073 (1974).
24. Id. at 104-05, 524 P.2d at 1076-77. See Teeter, 19 Idaho 355, 114 P. 8; Young-
blood v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. App. 2d 481, 325 P.2d 587 (1958); Wellman v.
Kelley, 197 Or. 553, 252 P.2d 816 (1953).
25. Dayley, 96 Idaho at 104, 524 P.2d at 1076.
26. Id. at 104-05, 524 P.2d at 1076-77 (McQuade, J., dissenting).
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in Smith v. King Creek Grazing Association." There the court held
that a lower landowner was not entitled to injunctive relief from a
water flow enhanced by acts of the upper proprietor, so long as the
increased flow was contained within a natural watercourse. 8
The Smith court also recognized that narrow preoccupation with
incremental modifications to the "civil law" rule might be supplanted
by a broader view of surface water controversies. The court specifically
noted that "[a]n invasion of surface water upon one's land, caused by
alteration of the natural flow on another's land, may constitute a form
of nuisance. '29 However, the court left for another day the task of inte-
grating nuisance law with surface water law.
II. THE PROPOSED SYNTHESIS
Dean Edward Levi has written:
The problem for the law is: When will it be just to treat differ-
ent cases as though they were the same? A working legal sys-
tem must therefore be willing to pick out key similarities and
to reason from them to the justice of applying a common
classification. 0
The rules of surface water law and of nuisance law remain separate in
Idaho. A "common classification" has not yet been achieved. But the
gap may be narrowing. As noted, the Court of Appeals has recognized
that surface water invasions may be a form of nuisance, and the Sec-
ond Restatement so classifies them. Our Supreme Court occasionally
has softened its formulation of the "civil law" rule by references to
reasonableness-a concept that resides at the heart of nuisance law.
Moreover, even where reasonableness is not specifically mentioned, an
element of flexibility has been injected into the "civil law" rule by the
corollary that an upper landowner may alter the natural flow so long as
it remains within a natural watercourse.
This exception to strict application of the "civil law" rule illus-
trates a general trend in other states toward modification of the rule.31
Some states have grafted reasonable use exceptions to the "civil law"
rule. 2 Others have adopted the "reasonable use" rule explicitly. For
27. - Idaho -, 671 P.2d 1107 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983).
28. Id. at -, 671 P.2d at 1112.
29. Id. at -, 671 P.2d at 1109.
30. E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Cm. L. REv. 501, 502
(1948) (subsequently republished as a book under the same title).
31. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 10.
32. See cases cited in Annot., supra note 11, at 1198, 1211-16.
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example, the State of Nevada, which had adopted the "civil law" rule
in a decision quoted at length by our Supreme Court in Loosli, recently
embraced the "reasonable use" doctrine.3 8 The trend toward adopting
the "reasonable use" rule, or toward modifying the "civil law" rule to
include an element of reasonableness, is a response to criticism leveled
at the "civil law" rule. The rule, with its emphasis upon preserving the
natural flow of surface water, has been perceived as unduly restrictive
upon development of property and too inflexible to deal with the com-
plexities of urban growth. 4
Basic economy theory offers a useful perspective on these criti-
cisms. As the Court of Appeals noted in Carpenter v. Double R. Cattle
Co.,3s economic theory focuses upon two objectives: "efficiency" and
"distributive justice." Efficiency refers to the aggregate surplus of ben-
efits over costs of economic activity. Distributive justice refers to the
allocation of these benefits and costs according to the values of society.
Each of these objectives is affected by "externalities"-costs of ec-
onomic activity not borne by the economic enterprise that generates
them. When one property owner enhances the use of his land by alter-
ing a surface water flow to the detriment of his neighbor, he has "ex-
ternalized" a cost of his economic activity. This externalizing of bur-
dens, without compensation, prevents our market system from
reflecting the true cost of products or services provided by the enter-
prise. It distorts price signals that critically affect decisions in the mar-
ket. This distortion, in turn, affects the goals of efficiency and distribu-
tive justice. Resources cannot be allocated efficiently in a market
economy unless prices reflect true costs. Similarly, the benefits and
costs of economic activity cannot be distributed in congruence with so-
cietal values unless the benefits are explicitly identified to the correla-
tive costs. Thus, both efficiency and distributive justice demand con-
trol of externalities.
However, these goals have different implications for the legal prin-
ciples by which such control should be exercised. In surface water
cases, efficiency disfavors the "civil law" rule"6 where the rule would
preclude development of higher land at the expense of lower ground,
even if the benefit to the higher proprietor exceeded the costs to the
lower proprietor. Ideally, this inefficient result could be overcome by
bargaining and voluntary transfers between the parties, by which the
33. County of Clark v. Powers, 96 Nev. 497, 611 P.2d 1072 (1980).
34. Annot., supra note 11, at 1197; County of Clark v. Powers, 96 Nev. at 503, 611
P.2d at 1076.
35. - Idaho -, 669 P.2d 643.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
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upper proprietor would compensate the lower proprietor. 7 However,
the real world is not free from impediments to exchange. For various
reasons, including human obstinacy, neighbors do not always act in
their rational, economic self-interest. In many cases voluntary transfers
do not occur. Lawsuits are filed instead. A standard of reasonableness,
with its balancing approach, provides the closest judicial eqivalent to
efficient allocation of resources through voluntary transfers.
However, our economic system is concerned not only with effi-
ciency but also with distributive justice. The "civil law" rule embodies
important societal values. The "civil law" rule is based upon a princi-
ple expressed in the ancient maxim aqua currit et debet currere, ut
currere solebat-water flows and should be allowed to flow, in its natu-
ral channel. This principle is anchored by philosophical and pragmatic
values. Philosophically, it reflects a view that man's best interests are
served by retaining nature's system of watersheds. Pragmatically, it
promotes stability in land use arrangements, and minimizes surprise,
by conforming man-made law as closely as possible to the enduring law
of nature. It permits each landowner to ascertain the burdens of natu-
ral water drainage in the watershed serving his area, and to act accord-
ingly. "[E]ach successive owner takes with whatever advantages or in-
conveniences nature has stamped upon his land."88 A standard of
reasonableness affords no such protection to watersheds, nor such pre-
dictability to land use patterns.
In case law, the growing convergence of the "civil law" rule with a
standard of reasonableness has occurred without explicit judicial recog-
nition of the tension between efficiency and distributive justice. Effi-
ciency has ruled the day. To achieve efficiency, the courts have estab-
lished the trend toward reasonable flexibility in the "civil law" rule. In
so doing they have gravitated, perhaps unknowingly, toward the gen-
eral balancing test of nuisance liability-weighing the benefits derived
against the burdens imposed by altering the natural flow of surface
waters.
But the "civil law" rule embraces values which are too impor-
tant-and too deeply rooted in decades of Idaho decisions in surface
water cases-to be wholly discarded in the pursuit of efficiency. If a
standard of reasonableness ultimately is adopted for greater efficiency,
it should retain-so far as possible-the principles underlying the
"civil law" rule which preserve natural flows and watercourses, and
which minimize disruptions in land use arrangements.
The following synthesis is proposed. In accord with the Second
37. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
38. Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Il. 158, 162 (1869).
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Restatement, an "intentional" invasion by surface water should be
deemed a nuisance, for which an injunction may issue and damages
may be recovered, if the harm created by the invasion of surface water
exceeds the utility of the activity causing the invasion. Alternatively, if
the harm is determined to be serious, but does not outweigh the utility
of the activity, the invasion still should be deemed a nuisance, for the
purpose of damage liability, if compensating for this harm and for sim-
ilar harm to others would not render the activity unfeasible. However,
in recognition of the principles underlying the "civil law" rule, the trier
of fact should consider the source of invasion. If the invasion is entirely
attributable to a natural flow of surface water, the law recognizes no
harm. Similarly, if the invasion is attributed to an altered flow of sur-
face water, but the flow is contained within a natural watercourse, no
harm should be deemed to exist.
Only if the invasion is attributed to an altered flow, which is not
entirely confined by a natural watercourse, should harm be recognized.
In those cases the gravity of the harm should be weighed against the
utility of the activity producing the invasion. In this balancing process,
the values placed by the "civil law" rule upon natural flows and water-
courses should be reflected among the factors to be considered in mea-
suring harm and utility. Lists of such facts appear in sections 827 and
828 of the Second Restatement. These sections refer, in part, to the
social values of the use invaded and of the activity producing the inva-
sion. Thus, the social value of the use invaded should be deemed en-
hanced if it strives to preserve a natural flow of surface water. Con-
versely, the social value of the activity producing the invasion should
be deemed diminished if it disrupts a significant natural watercourse
or system of watercourses s9
The implications of this proposed synthesis may be illustrated by
a retrospective look at the Smith and Dayley decisions. In Smith, it
will be recalled that the Idaho Court of Appeals held an upper land-
owner entitled to alter the natural flow of surface water reaching an-
other's land below, so long as the altered flow could be contained
within a natural watercourse. The synthesis suggested here would
reach the same result. A court applying the synthesis would not reach
the task of weighing the lower landowner's asserted harm against the
utility of the upper landowner's activities, because no harm would be
deemed to arise from an altered flow of surface water contained within
39. If any "intentional" invasion were produced by malicious conduct, were avoida-
ble, produced severe harm, or arose from conduct unsuited to the locality, then the tests
proposed here would be modified in accord with Sections 829-31 of the SECOND RESTATE-




In Dayley a majority of the Idaho Supreme Court held that no
watercourse existed and, therefore, the City of Burley as the upper
proprietor was not entitled to collect surface water through its storm
sewer system and cause it to drain upon other lands below. A court
applying the synthesis suggested here would not necessarily have
reached this result. Rather, having determined that no watercourse ex-
isted, the court would weigh the harm suffered by the lower proprietors
against the utility ascribed to the City of Burley's activity. If the utility
outweighed the harm, there would be no liability under the first of the
Second Restatement's two tests of nuisance represented by an "inten-
tional" invasion. The court then would inquire whether the harm, al-
though exceeded by the utility, nevertheless was serious and whether
compensating for this harm and for similar harm to others would
render the activity unfeasible. Under this second test, if the court de-
termined that the harm was serious and that compensation was feasi-
ble, the lower proprietors might receive compensation in damages al-
though they would not be entitled to injunctive relief.40
The author makes no claim that the proposed synthesis is perfect.
Adherents to the "civil law" rule as well as advocates of a standard of
reasonableness may be discomforted by it. Detractors from the Second
Restatement's twofold test of nuisance liability also might oppose it.
However, the proposed synthesis is intended to be a point of begin-
ning-not necessarily the destination-of a dialogue among scholars,
the bench and the bar, concerning the relationship between surface
water law and nuisance law. The two no longer should be treated as
wholly separate. The time has come to recognize the conceptual unity
of law governing invasions by surface water.
40. For a similar application of the SECOND RESTATEMENT'S tests of nuisance liabil-
ity, See Pendergrast, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787.
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